IOS/FS: Rewrite NAND savestating

This makes us savestate the NAND using the same APIs the guest uses
instead of directly touching the host files. This solves several
problems:

* If the user loaded a malicious savestate, it could use path traversal
  to overwrite arbitrary files on the host file system. (Reported by
  MrSynAckster.)
* Metadata (UID, GID, attribute, modes) wasn't being savestated.
* NAND redirects weren't handled, except for NAND redirects at the root
  of where the savestate was being done. (This only possibly matters if
  TASing a Riivolution patch. The root of the savestate is at /tmp when
  not TASing, and the only case where we do a NAND redirect is inside
  /title if requested by a Riivolution patch.)

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions